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emergency management and earthquake recovery from the 2010 -2011 
Canterbury Earthquakes 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose: The paper illustrates how accountability of collaborative governance was constituted 
in the context of disaster managerial work carried out by the Government, local authorities, 
and Māori community organisations, after the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes in New 
Zealand.  
 
Methodology: A case study detailing the communitarian approach to disaster recovery 
management by a nationalised Māori earthquake response network is contrasted with the 
formal emergency management infrastructure’s response to the Canterbury earthquakes.  
 
Findings: Critical analysis of the effectiveness and failures of these approaches highlights   the 
institutional and cultural political issues that hinder the institutionalization of collaborative 
and accountable governance in the fields of disaster risk reduction and emergency 
management.  
 
Implications: The paper contributes to the accountability research and practice in general and 
disaster accountability in particular by addressing a more multifaceted model of 
“accountability combined with collaborative governance” as a way to build on and critique 
some of the seemingly more narrow views of accountability.  
 
Originality: The study presents rare insights on the interactions between formal and 
community level accountability and collaborative governance in the context of New Public 
Governance (NPG).  
 
Keywords: Accountability, Collaborative governance, Canterbury earthquakes, disaster 
management, Sendai framework  
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1. Introduction  
The paper illustrates how “accountability in collaborative governance” was constituted and 
conducted by nationalized Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) and regional 
governmental agencies, such as the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and 
local Maori earthquakes recovery network, responding to the impacts of the 2010-2011 
Canterbury earthquakes in New Zealand (NZ). NZ’ 2010 and 2011 earthquake sequence, which 
is one of the nation’s most devastating natural hazard disasters on record (NZ History, 2017), 
triggered extensive damage across the Canterbury region. Canterbury was heavily affected, 
especially by the February 22, 2011 earthquake, which killed 185 people and injured 9000 
while creating damage to 170,000 buildings and infrastructure already weakened by the 
Canterbury earthquake of September 2010 and related aftershocks (Canterbury Earthquake 
Royal Commission, 2012). Economically, it has been estimated that around NZD 20 billion (in 
2011 prices) had to be spent on repairing or replacing damaged assets, which was equal to some 
ten percent of NZ’s annual domestic output. In addition, the cost of repairing or replacing 
residential property damage was estimated as NZD 13 billion, while the reinstatement of 
commercial damage was estimated to be NZD 4 billion. Moreover, the infrastructure damage 
repair and replacement was expected to cost NZD 3 billion (Parker and Steenkamp, 2012).  
 
The paper draws on the literature about accountability in the context of “collaborative 
governance” to contrast two sets of responses to above 2010-2011 earthquakes in Canterbury, 
NZ. One set of responses are characterised as top down responses at the government level. The 
other set of responses are related to more local, culturally appropriate Maori Earthquake 
recovery network. The paper attempts to analyse and characterise the ways these two sets of 
responses were taken place in the collaborative disaster governance arenas in NZ. The term 
“accountability in collaborative governance” represents a more multifaceted and holistic model 
than other narrowly defined conceptions of accountability such as financial, political or social 
(Taylor et al., 2014). This increased level of plurality occurs because “accountability in 
collaborative governance” integrates multiple forms of accountabilities - vertical, horizontal, 
downward and diagonal - surrounded either by collaborative working or cross-organisational 
working relationships. Critics state (Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2006, 2011; Sørensen, 
2012; Baker, 2014) that the failure of good governance is caused by a lack of mixed 
accountability standards, such as communication, information and coordination arrangements 
between collaborative organisations and their work environment.  
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A previous study by O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) revealed how the managers in an Irish 
NGO historically relied on internal forms of accountability that has been augmented with a 
range of ad hoc external accountability mechanisms towards a narrow range of (potentially) 
powerful stakeholders. Realizing the counter-productivity of this approach to achieve their 
NGO’s mission, the NGO leadership later expressed an interest toward a broader and more 
holistic accountability conceptions. O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) argued that these findings 
could create a platform for a holistic accountability practice in NGOs more generally. However, 
there has been a relative dearth of further studies and discussions on this topic, particularly in 
the context of private-public settings such as disaster recovery. Having said that this study 
views Sørensen (2012)’s proposal for a “collective accountability” in New Public Governance 
(NPG) initiatives as a way forward to the findings of O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008). Sørensen 
(2012) argued that those who participate in a collaborative working should be collectively 
accountable for their actions and must produce collective accounts of the issues and problems 
that have initiated the collaboration (Sørensen, 2012, p. 13). Applying this “collective form of 
accountability in collaborative governance” framework (Sørensen, 2012), this study 
contributes to the debate in litearture for a need of holistic accountability in NGOs and public-
private partnerships, such as disaster recovery. Empirically, the paper demonstrates the 
problametic nature and the potentail need for enactment of some forms of collaborative 
accountablity practices and devices in the study context of NZ.    
 
Moreover, this study will add to the disaster accounting and accountability literature. For 
instance, Lai et al. (2014) investigated the social aspects of the accounting system used by 
authorities in charge of a recovery process from a devastating flood disaster. They positively 
claimed that accounting procedures activated after this disaster not only gave visibility to flood 
damages and recovery actions, but also favored a sense of inter-dependency between all of the 
players involved. Focusing on the flood events occurred in the State of Victoria, Australia 
during 2010‐11, Sciulli (2017) revealed the role accounting played in addressing the impact of 
a natural disaster on an individual level. Thus, the local government managers used the 
accounting information to eradicate evolving some confusion among local councils and rural 
communities with regard to their eligibility and timing to assess the funding support provided 
by State and Federal Government. Sargiacomo (2015) demonstrated how the local health 
authorities applied a set of calculative practices and accounting classification systems to 
provide the provision of disaster relief funding contingent. In particular, the accounting 
classification systems were used to identify additional and traceable earthquake-related 
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expenditures worked in tandem with disaster related scientific classifications to define the 
seismic events as a site for exceptional governance, during the emergency responses in 2009 
earthquake in Abruzzo, Italy. In their pivotal study, Perkiss and Moerman (2017) applied 
sociology of worth (SOW) framework to construct a narrative of Hurricane Katrina and 
explored the multiple rationalities and experiences in relation to ‘common good’ within disaster 
related ‘social reality”. Their study illustrated the contentions, compromises and conflicts, as 
well as the neglected or hidden accounts required to achieve the common good of disaster 
related situations. Contrary to them, Baker (2014) examined the breakdowns in accountability 
during and after the storm which were manifested by a lack of communication between 
government officials and a failure on the part of officials to act responsibly on behalf of victims, 
many of whom were poor, black and elderly. In line with this view, Everett and Friesen (2010) 
examined three leading humanitarian agencies including the Red Cross and revealed how the 
actors involved in humanitarian assistance programs jeopardize their goals by adhering to a 
number of contradictory scripts related to neutrality, commerce, and performance. They argue 
for the inseparability of technical and moral accountability in executing humanitarian relief. 
Subsequently, Sargiacomo at al. (2014) reported when, how, and with what effects accounting 
and other associated practices through the three lenses of private-interest maximization, 
inequality, and suffering were mobilized in the follow-up to an earthquake in central Italy. His 
findings illustrated how accounting actors simultaneously serve multiple ethical masters, and 
how one of these can come to dominate accounting's ‘moral economy’. Extending the 
knowledge on these disaster accounting and accountability, the current study will analyze the 
two contrasting perspectives adopted by the state and the community groups (Maori) during 
Canterbury natural disasters in NZ. Thus, the later was adopted according to Maori values and 
practices, as well as their historically established local (Maori) knowledge. The paper will 
explain how these two approaches could be linked within a common arena of “accountability 
in collaborative disaster governance”.  
 
Intending a contribution to policy, the study reflects the ways in which the concept of 
“accountability in collaborative governance” may apply collectively to recovery responses and 
governance policies within disaster recovery contexts involving multiple agencies and actors 
at different levels. The study adopts a comparative case study approach built around various 
primary and secondary sources, including three qualitative research projects previously 
conducted with key stakeholders to analyse the institutional views and participants’ 
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experiences of the governance impacts of the Canterbury earthquake disasters of 2010 and 
2011.  
  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section two, the paper discusses the 
existing literature on disaster accounting and accountability, and presents the analytical model 
of “accountability in collaborative forms of governance”. The research methods are outlined in 
section three. Section four presents the case study analysis based on the “accountability in 
collaborative governance” model. This section includes the findings from two cases, the 
disaster recovery responses from government level and the responses by Maori Earth quake 
recovery network. The final section contains the discussion and concluding remarks of the 
study. 
 
2. Disaster accounting and accountability literature and the “accountability in 
collaborative governance” model 
 
Factors associated with enacting accountability in disaster management such as sets of laws, 
rules, practices and cultural morals are a collective source of concern amongst accounting 
researchers. This is because of enduring corruption and wastage of public resources, slow 
disaster recovery responses and continued failure to reach intended target groups  where the 
accountability aspects of disaster management in planning, executing and reporting are 
questioned (Everett and Friesen, 2010; Baker, 2014; Sargiacomo, 2014; Sargiacomo et al., 
2014; Lai, 2014; Taylor et al., 2014; Walker, 2014). The crucial topic of disaster accountability 
issues is to distinguish between “calculative accountability” and “narrative accountability 
(Everett and Friesen, 2010; McKernan and McPhail, 2012; Kamuf, 2007; Sargiacomo at al., 
2014; Perkiss and Moerman, 2017). The term “calculative accountability” relates to the 
objective facts, hard evidence, and the numbers, e.g. no of displaced people, cost of damaged 
properties and accounting records of resource allocations that can depict themselves (Kamuf, 
2007). This term also encompasses laws and regulations which create administrative structures 
that ensure corporate and government accountability to stakeholders including the community 
and society (Baker, 2014; Sciulli, 2017; Sargiacomo, 2015). In contrast “narrative 
accountability” in disaster situations relates to emotions and qualitative judgments of the 
stakeholders, e.g. judgments of the disaster victims regarding the effectiveness of disaster relief 
efforts (Everett and Friesen, 2010; McKernan and McPhail, 2012; Kamuf, 2007; Baker, 2014; 
Perkiss and Moerman, 2017).  
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However, as previously stated, the application of the term accountability into collaborative 
working or cross-organisational working relationships creates a more complex phenomenan 
because of the requirement of multiple forms of accountabilities, namely vertical, horizontal, 
downward and diagonal from the perspective of government and non-governmental agencies 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008; Everett and Friesen, 2010; Hodges, 2012; Taylor et al, 2014; 
Bakers, 2014; Sargiacomo et al, 2014; Sargiacomo, 2015; Perkiss and Moerman, 2017). As 
some critics have claimed (Lipton et al., 2005; Everett and Friesen, 2010; Bakers, 2014) the 
failure of accountability in collaborative working relationships is mainly caused by a lack of 
proper communication mechanisms between the agencies, e.g. the government organisations, 
NGOs, external funders and local institutions.  
 
Despite the preceding negative exemplars, O’Dwyer and Unerman’s (2008) work highlights 
that at least at the conceptual level, this horizontal form of accountability between relatively 
autonomous agencies operating in the same context has the ability to function effectively 
through relational networks. This horizontal accountability is also conceptually connected with 
two other forms of accountabilities, namely social accountability and diagonal accountability 
(Goetz and Jenkins, 2001; Sørensen, 2012). In particular, the social accountability is known as 
a form of ‘society driven horizontal accountability’ and expected to demonstrate direct 
responsibility from government, non-governmental agencies and business organisations to the 
community and society (Sørensen, 2012; Kohli, 2012). The World Bank’s recent introduction 
of several reporting strategies to the member countries, such as participatory budgeting, social 
audit, public expenditure tracking, social mobilisation and citizen monitoring, illustrate the 
importance of this society driven horizontal accountability (World Bank, 2014). That said, by 
requiring the above reporting strategies, the World Bank also expects to promote a diagonal 
accountability concept in its member countries by ensuring the direct engagement and 
watchdog role of its citizens within government and non-governmental organisations.   
 
On a different perspective, new public governance (NPG) discourse has been proclaimed as an 
alternative governance paradigm to public-sector management, with some suggesting that it 
replaces classical public administration (CPA) and new public management (NPM) (Pollitt et 
al., 2004; Bouckaert et al., 2010). NPG intends to transform the fragmented governance 
capacity within public-sector entities by bringing in greater coordination and collaboration to 
public-sector activities (Sørensen, 2012). Sørensen (2012) argued that NPG articulates a 
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“collective accountability” perspective and that those who participate in a collaborative 
working embrace are collectively accountable for their actions. For instance, “they must 
produce collective accounts of the issues and problems that have initiated the collaboration, the 
applied strategies for dealing with these problems and issues, the activities launched to 
implement these strategies, and the outcomes that have been produced” (Sørensen, 2012, p. 
13). Applying collaborative accountability to a collaborative governance approach to manage  
disaster contexts is valuable.  
 
This approach pinpoints the importance of establishing an accountability holder (e.g. 
administrative leaders, disaster victims, resilience community) with the ability to hold other 
accountability holders (politicians, government organisations, NGOs and private sector 
entities) with governance responsibilities for collaborative disaster resilience and recovery 
efforts, collectively to account. The analytical model shown in Figure 1, developed through 
drawing on Sørensen’s (2012) ideas of NPG accountability, is proposed as a mechanism for 
elucidating understandings about the “accountability of collaborative governance” in the 
disaster management field.   
 
[Insert the Figure 1 here] 
 
The collaborative governance arenas of the model can mirror the roles and activities performed 
by the public, private and non-governmental actors both as accountability holders and as 
accountability holdees, during the disaster recovery process and practices. The forms of 
accountability such as calculative and narrative (Everett and Friesen, 2010; McKernan and 
McPhail, 2012; Kamuf, 2007; Sargiacomo et al., 2014; Sargiacomo, 2015; Perkiss and 
Moerman, 2017) as well as vertical, horizontal, social and diagonal (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001; 
Sørensen, 2012) all shape the form of holistic or collective accountability practices within 
NPG, and more generally the accountability is operating more centrally in the collaborative 
governance model. On the other hand, by employing a “collective” (Sørensen, 2012) or holistic 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008) accountability approach, the collaborative governance model 
builds and extends all forms of accountabilities in NPG. This phenomenon is being discussed 
further in the remaining sections of the paper. Through the evidence of two case studies, the 
paper will highlight how this collective accountability in collaborative governance model 
enacted in the state responses and the Maori responses during Christchurch disasters.  
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3. Methodology 
 
The findings of the study were based on the comparative analysis of two cases; state response 
and Maori community response to Canterbury disasters. Research data was collected from 
various primary and secondary sources including three qualitative research projects previously 
conducted with key stakeholders involved in disaster management and recovery efforts in 
Canterbury. The first project by the first and third author and a pilot study exploring the 
experiences of members of various disaster management stakeholder agencies tasked with 
managing the formal response. The analysis of this initial pilot study indicated that there were 
some recognisable accountability gaps in collaborative working between the disaster 
management agencies in NZ. In addition, the second author conducted two community-based 
participatory research projects in partnership with the local Māori community in order to 
explore Māori tribal responses to the Christchurch earthquakes as well as document and 
develop understandings about the factors that build Māori resilience.  
 
The two community-based qualitative research projects have been conducted using a Kaupapa 
Māori research approach, which ensures that research is designed by and for Māori, addresses 
Māori concerns, is implemented by predominantly Māori researchers and conducted in 
accordance with Māori cultural values and research practices (Smith, 2012). Te Rūnanga o 
Ngāi Tahu1 and Ngā Hau e Whā2 Urban Māori Authority facilitated the recruitment of research 
participants. participants (N=100+). Ninety semi-structured individual and group interviews 
were conducted with participants, during which dialogical (conversational) interviewing 
techniques (Frank 2005) were used to elicit 120 disaster narratives. Alternatively, the initial 
pilot study was based on the open-ended interviews with local authority officials in 
Christchurch and officials in Department of Prime minister and Cabinet (DPMC) New Zealand. 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
 
The findings and reflections from the secondary data were used to verify the overall thrust of 
findings. The main arguments of the paper were significantly developed from secondary 
 
1
 Ngāi Tahu is the local Māori tribe for Christchurch and most of the South Island. Their regional tribal authority 
is called as Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu (TRoNT) (Lambert, 2014).  
2
 Ngā Hau e Whā means the Four Winds. This implicates a symbolic meeting place for the peoples from 
everywhere (Foster, 2015). 
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analysis of reports published by government and non-governmental organisations in NZ and 
pre-existing published research (see the following references: AERU, 2011; Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2014; New Zealand Statutes, 2002; Controller and Auditor 
General., 2017; ECan Environment Canterbury, 2013; FEMA,  2011; New Zealand Police, 
n.d.; NZ History, 2017; Statistics New Zealand, 2014a and 2014b.; Department of Prime 
minister and Cabinet (DPMC) New Zealand, 2017; Treasury New Zealand, 2016; UNISDR, 
2005 and 2015). These multiple viewpoints generated from secondary and primary data sources 
have allowed us for greater and improved triangulation of the findings.   
 
In particular, data from interview narratives were adopted to enrich the analysis, as well as to 
explain the particular qualitative discourse in relation to the “accountability affairs in 
collaborative governance”. The data were analysed using the narrative analysis method 
(Bruner, 1986; Denzin, 1989; Rosenweld and Ochburg, 1992). The conceptual themes were 
identified from the “accountability in collaborative disaster governance” model (Figure 1), e.g. 
the important information for accountability holders such as institutionalized transparency and 
communication, performance measurements, public knowledge of disaster recovery programs 
and publicly accessible evaluations of performance and user satisfaction; mixed accountability 
standards. This method helped the authors pinpoint, examine, and records patterns (or 
"themes") within interviews and secondary data. To reduce the risk of de-contextualization of 
interview talk, transcript texts were analysed in a paragraph format using a narrative unit 
approach. These themes identified through data and themes drew on the analytical model 
helped us to describe the collective accountability in collaborative governance phenomenon 
and address the characteristics of collaborative accountability, authority, agency and actions of 
two cases.  
 
4. Case analysis  
This analysis section is organised around two main areas of “accountability in collaborative 
governance”. First, the performances and goal achievements of government institutions, such 
as CDEM, regional and local councils, Regional Emergency Management Offices, Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Agency (CERA) are outlined. Secondly, Māori responses to the 
earthquakes as well as their perceptions, levels of satisfaction regarding services offered by 
government institutions, and attitudes toward the mutual benefits derived from collaboration 
with government, are discussed. Our evidence presented in this section demonstrates how these 
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two main parties have engaged with duplicating, as well as gap filling roles and tasks in the 
recovery process.   
 
4.1 Case 1: the “accountability in collaborative governance” in Canterbury: the 
performances and goal achievements by CERA, CDEM and other government entities  
 
The government responses to the Christchurch earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 included the 
establishment of disaster recovery processes led by central government agencies and a Minister 
other than the Minister of Civil Defence, were indicative of a more flexible approach to the 
governance, coordination and direction of emergency response and recovery than that 
envisaged in the CDEM Act and National CDEM Plan operating at the time of both incidents 
(McLean et al., 2012; Mamula-Seadon and McLean, 2015).  
 
During the September 2010 earthquake, it has been reported that just a few hours after the 
incident the Christchurch City Council, the Waimakariri District and the Selwyn District; three 
territorial authorities declared local emergencies and activated their emergency operation 
centres (EOCs). The regional CDEM Group Emergency Coordination Centre was also 
activated but did not declare a regional emergency at the group level. At the national level, the 
national crisis management centre (NCMC) was activated. Two days after the 2010 earthquake 
an ad-hoc Cabinet Committee on Canterbury Earthquake Recovery was established supported 
by the new cabinet position of the Minister of Canterbury Earthquake Recovery (Mamula-
Seadon and McLean, 2015). Likewise, during the February 2011 earthquake, Minister of Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management declared a state of national emergency for the city of 
Christchurch. This decision was taken to ensure the superior coordination between central and 
local authorities, and at the same time a decision was made to relocate Christchurch City and 
the Canterbury Group Civil Defence organisations to a single Emergency Operations Centre, 
which was named the Christchurch Response Centre (CRC) (Mamula-Seadon and McLean, 
2015). Similar to the 2010 earthquake response, the CRC structure expected to coordinate 
Recovery, but without a formal Recovery Manager function (Mamula-Seadon and McLean, 
2015). In this complex context, the central government and the Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery started to consider a new national disaster recovery 
governance arrangement. Subsequently, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
(CERA) was set up as a government department soon after the February 2011 earthquake to 
lead and co-ordinate the recovery from the earthquakes. After the 22 February 2011 
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government recognised that the scale of the recovery needed was beyond the capability of the 
existing arrangements since the 4 September 2010 earthquake. Drawing international disaster 
recovery experience, the government decided to establish a single authority with specific 
powers to focus on the recovery from the Canterbury earthquakes (Controller and Auditor 
General, 2017). As a result in March 2011, CERA was set up as a government department 
under the State Sector Act 1988.  
 
As a government department CERA allowed a high degree of central control, with a leadership 
structure that is expected to act decisively and quickly, and is closely aligned with the 
Government's priorities within disaster governance arena. CERA expected to serve the 
earthquake impacted communities of "greater Christchurch", which was defined as the districts 
of Christchurch City Council, Selwyn District Council, Waimakariri District Council, and the 
adjoining coastal marine area. CERA's role included: providing leadership and co-ordination 
for the recovery effort; enabling an effective and timely recovery, monitoring the progress of 
the recovery; and administering the Act. From the perspective of collaborative governance - as 
the main accountability holder (controller of other accountability holders), CERA supposed to 
facilitate transparency and communication between collaborative organisations in order to 
create wider knowledge and trust among the public on recovery activities and build satisfaction 
among the disaster victims and broader Christchurch community. However, several significant 
collaborative accountability issues emerged in the governance of disaster recovery process. 
The remaining paragraphs will analyse how CERA and CDEM have managed the recovery 
plans and processes during the Christchurch disaster 2011.  
 
Firstly, the early recovery phase of the 2011 earthquake highlighted that CERA’s top-heavy 
recovery structure did not manage to engage in planning activities at the community level 
(Mamula-Seadon and McLean, 2015). Likewise, the Auditor General’s report presented to the 
NZ parliament (2017) showed that CERA’s role as the coordination agency had also been 
derailed at the end of Christchurch rebuilding process because the organistaion was not able to 
engage effectively with all stakeholders and there was break down in the collaborative 
accountabilty. As stated in the overview of the Auditor General’s report:  
 
“it became more challenging for CERA to maintain momentum as the recovery moved 
into the deconstruction phase. Its role became less clear as it took on responsibility for 
delivering more projects and programmes. CERA needed to adapt to maintain its 
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earlier momentum. Similarly, CERA's leadership of the Central City Recovery 
Programme began effectively with the publication of the Christchurch Central 
Recovery Plan, but the actual delivery of the plan was less successful. Engagement with 
stakeholders suffered from a lack of clarity about the role of the Christchurch Central 
Development Unit, and there were delays in nearly all of the CERA-led Anchor 
Projects” (Controller and Auditor General, 2017, p.6).  
 
Secondly, the review of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management response to the 22 
February 2011 Christchurch earthquake (McLean et al., 2012) highlighted that following the 
earthquakes in 2010 and 2011, the Christchurch recovery management lacked proper vertical 
accountability standards required for collaborative governance of the disaster, i.e. 
communication and transparency with the community groups and volunteers (Mamula-Seadon 
& McLean, 2015). This lack of effective communication created unwarranted delays and 
tensions in their responses to disaster victims (Solomon, 2012). 
 
This point has been further highlighted by the Auditor General’s report (2017) presented to the 
parliament. It stated:  
 
“CERA did not have an effective approach to managing its Anchor Projects as a 
coherent programme of work. In my 2012 report, Roles, responsibilities, and funding 
of public entities after the Canterbury earthquakes, I emphasised the importance of 
effective collaboration. Throughout the recovery CERA needed to manage tensions 
with residents, and central and local government. Although agencies were able to work 
effectively at an operational level, these tensions caused delays at a governance level, 
particularly with Christchurch City Council. In my view, both CERA and the 
Christchurch City Council were not as open or transparent with one another as is 
required for an effective recovery. This caused delays in some programmes. I 
acknowledge the challenges for an agency like CERA in communicating with a 
community that is recovering from a disaster, but CERA could have been more effective 
and efficient in its communication and engagement with the community” (Controller 
and Auditor General ,2017, p.6). 
 
The community surveys conducted also reflected that the social accountability standards such 
as public's trust and confidence in information from the government agencies in particular 
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CERA has declined over time, and many in the community were not satisfied (Controller and 
Auditor General, 2017). According to the Auditor General’s report (2017) to parliament, a key 
reason for the decline in trust is that the community didn’t feel that they had enough 
opportunities to influence decision-making about the recovery. It stated:  
 
“CERA increased its expenditure on communications, but it did not adapt or change 
its approach well enough”.  
“Some stakeholders, particularly community groups, felt that the community forum was 
too focused on Ministers and not enough on the community. They also felt that, because 
of the confidential nature of the information provided to the forum, members of the 
forum were limited in their ability to consult with their communities on policy options”.  
“We were told that the early meetings were not well organised and the community was 
not effectively engaged in managing the meetings or designing a communication 
strategy for affected communities” (Controller and Auditor General, 2017, p.6, p.43, 
p.50). 
 
Accepting this limitation in their work, in their learning and legacy reports CERA noted 
(Controller and Auditor General, 2017): 
“Some communities did not trust CERA and that “some consider that the public has 
not had input into some of the big decisions made”.  
“It had  
• been good at: communication but not engagement – communities felt like 
they were being talked at, rather than listened to;  
• tended to wait until solutions were found before sharing information, which 
meant that communities did not see the “behind-the-scenes work” of CERA 
and its partners in planning the recovery; and  
• communicated unrealistic time frames, which meant that communities” 
(p.42).    
 
Thirdly, the recovery management experienced unnecessary duplication of services, and in 
some cases, experienced non-delivery of essential resources or slow progress in the rebuilding 
process due to weaknesses in collective accountability standards, such as sub-optimal local and 
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multi-agency coordination and collaboration. As reported by Wright (2012) in NZ’s online 
newspaper; Stuff:  
 
“Weaknesses and tensions" between the Christchurch City Council and Civil Defence 
after the February 22 earthquake "put people and property at risk", an independent 
review into the emergency response has found. The report into the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management response to the disaster, released yesterday, found the 
response "can justifiably be regarded as having been well-managed and effective. 
However, it said "the duplication of control . . . between Christchurch city [council] 
and the regional [Civil Defence Group] was not only inefficient but put people and 
property at risk. It recommended local government play no part in controlling future 
emergency responses, but that has not been adopted by the Cabinet”.  
 
Highlighting the weaknesses of horizontal accountability standards and collaborative 
governance between CERA and Christchurch City Council in the rebuilding process, the 
Auditor General’s report (2017) also stated:  
 
“After 2013 report, CERA strengthened its leadership role with Stronger Christchurch 
Infrastructure Rebuilding Team (SCIRT) and its monitoring of the Crown’s expenditure 
on the horizontal infrastructure rebuild through its Horizontal Infrastructure team. 
This helped reduce the cost to the Crown of the horizontal infrastructure rebuild. 
However, its earlier lack of leadership meant that levels of service and funding 
arrangements were not effectively agreed between the Crown and Christchurch City 
Council. This caused tensions between the Council and the Crown and led to significant 
delays in some projects later in the programme” (p. 35-36). 
 
Fourthly, it was evident that critical collaborative governance issues such as relational 
disconnections and tensions existed between local and regional governance entities, emergency 
management stakeholders, and more broadly the national emergency management 
infrastructure. These negative governance outcomes, such as tensions, which were due to 
situational and local political factors, created more problamatic accountabily standards, such 
as a lack of clarity around the delegation of, and authority or power to implement response 
actions in a cohesive manner as well as a lack of trust between key response stakeholders 
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(McLean et al., 2012; Mamula-Seadon and McLean, 2015). The Auditor General Report (2017) 
to Parliament for example, highlighted:  
“Communication between CERA and Christchurch City Council was not as open and 
transparent as is required for an effective recovery, which damaged the trust between 
the leadership of both organisations. This caused delays, such as to the repair of pipes 
and roads, as we reported in 2016” (p. 38)   
 
The report further added: 
“At times, CERA failed to prioritise its relationship and leadership role with 
Wellington-based government agencies. The lack of clarity in its role made it more 
challenging for CERA to influence and coordinate the work of the wider public sector” 
(p.36). 
 
MCDEM in their National Capability Assessments conducted for the period 2009-2012 
(MCDEM, n.d.a), identified the strategic importance of collaborative governance to disaster 
recovery and highlighted that the region-wide and all-agencies coordinating role of CEGs was 
not as well developed throughout the country even after the introduction of the reforming 
approach intended by the CDEM Act. However, there were instances of a mature and effective 
approach to comprehensive emergency management being implemented in some regions. 
Despite the requirement for multi-agency representation on regional CEGs, and for CDEM 
Groups to take a comprehensive emergency management (CDEM Act section 3(f) and all-
hazards approach (by way of the definition of "emergency management" in CDEM Act section 
4) for collaboartive governance, there was a tendency for the CEGs’ foci to be on readiness for 
natural hazards and the local government component of emergency management. These foci 
were attributed to the governance bodies for each CDEM Group being made up exclusively of 
local authority elected members, as well as influence from the more natural hazards and 
response-focused Civil Defence Act 1983. The situation that developed during the September 
2010 and subsequent Canterbury quake responses, where collaborative accountability 
standards such as local to regional (and, in some instances, multi-agency) coordination was 
less than optimal can be traced back in part, to the tenuous political and inter-organisational 
relationships within the region in the few years prior to the 2010-2011 earthquakes (Mamula-
Seadon and McLean, 2015).  
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Similarly, the collaborative accountability standards such as multi-agency coordination during 
the earthquake responses could have been more effective if several of the agencies involved 
had met their regional CDEM Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) "active representative" 
responsibilities as specified in the CDEM Act section 63. Overall, there was a lack of 
involvement (or engagement) of some important accountability holders, e.g. senior elected 
officials in bodies such as CDEM Group Joint Committees, resulting in inadequate 
organisational preparedness, and relatively disjointed risk reduction, response and recovery 
efforts (McLean et al., 2012; Mamula-Seadon and McLean, 2015). Acknowledging this critical 
issue, the Auditor General’s report (2017) to parliament further recommended:  
“Governance arrangements need to be reviewed for each phase of the recovery, and 
when activities change. This will ensure that governance arrangements are fit for 
purpose; delivering the recovery agency’s outputs and outcomes in the most effective 
and efficient way. However, particular attention needs be given to the clarity of role 
definition between the responsibilities of governance and management at both an 
organisational and project level” (p.9).   
 
Overall, these findings indicate that both national and regionally coordinated formal disaster 
management at the time of the post-earthquake disasters in Canterbury was largely hampered 
due to the failure of main accountability holders (e.g. CERA) to keep other accountability 
holders, such as government organisations, professionals and businesses in control. This has 
resulted in creating relatively weak “mixed accountability standards” within the Canterbury’s 
“collaborative disaster governance” framework. Specific accountability issues included 
ineffective implementation of standard performance measurements, a lack of institutional 
transparency, and inadequate multi-agency communication. Thus, there were considerable 
collaborative accountability concerns among people and community groups in relation to the 
coordination arrangements, political roles as well as information support and communication 
(McLean et al., 2012; Mamula-Seadon and McLean, 2015, AERU – Lincoln University, 2011). 
These issues extended into relational linkages with broader stakeholder groups and discrete 
communities residing within Canterbury including the local Māori community. In the next 
section, Māori collaborative responses to the sequence of major earthquakes in the Canterbury 
Region and related accountability are explored. Māori concerns regarding the emergency 
management infrastructure are also outlined.   
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Case 2: the accountability in collaborative governance: Maori perspective during the   
emergency management process in Canterbury   
   
According to the New Zealand 2006 census figures, when the February 22nd 2011 earthquake 
occurred in Christchurch, the urban Māori community comprised 25,725 individuals, and 
constituted 4.1% of the urban population, with the local tribe Ngāi Tahu comprising a minority 
42% (10,965) of the Māori demographic (Lambert, 2014). Moreover, Christchurch City 
Council household estimates (2010), indicated that Māori residents were geospatially 
concentrated in the low decile Easter Suburbs of Christchurch, which were the areas of the city 
that were most severely impacted by the February earthquake. In comparison with the wider 
community of Christchurch, it can thus be argued that the majority of Māori were 
disadvantaged due to disproportionately reduced access to financial resources, basic 
necessities, utilities, transport and support services (Paton et al., 2014). As a counter strategy, 
the Maori community has utilized their own Maori earthquake recovery network for the disaster 
recovery.   
 
Maori earthquake Recovery Network  
When the earthquakes occurred in Christchurch New Zealand during 2010 and 2011, the local 
Māori iwi (tribe), Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, had a cultural obligation to ensure the wellbeing 
of all Christchurch residents as well as the wider region (Solomon, 2012). After the February 
22, earthquake in 2011, the Iwi (tribe) initiated a meeting with Māori representatives from the 
Christchurch Urban Māori Authority, the Ministry of Māori Development, Māori 
parliamentarians, the New Zealand Police, NGOs and other tribes (Paton et al., 2014; Kenney 
and Phibbs, 2015) and established a nationalised Māori response network. The Ngāi Tahu 
(local Māori tribe) as the regional iwi. Te Rūnanga o (tribal authority) have given the 
responsibility as an accountability holder for  collaborative governance tasks of the Maori 
network, including the coordination of community support as well as communicated and 
negotiated decision-making with NGOs, other iwi (tribes) Māori stakeholders, as well as 
central government and local authorities (Kenney & Solomon, 2014). This process facilitated 
a collaboratively governed and well-integrated Māori response to the earthquakes, in that the 
Network’s emergency management practice was characterised by collaborative accountability 
standards, such as responsibility, authority, agency, and actions, in accordance with Māori 
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values3 (Kenney & Phibbs, 2015). Māori share a collective ‘ensemble’ identity that is 
genealogically linked across social communities, tribes and land (Kenney & Phibbs, 2015). 
Framed with the collaborative gaze of a Māori world view, the earthquakes may be considered 
catalysts that enabled expression of traditional communitarian governance features including 
behaviours and the revitalisation of traditional disaster management values and risk mitigation 
practices. Māori disaster management governance in the Christchurch context was shaped by 
the value kaitiakitanga (social and environmental stewardship), which imposed an obligation 
on all Māori involved in the response to care for flora, fauna, regional residents, evacuees and 
the broader environment. The notion of relational or collective accountability to one’s family, 
and tribe for the wellbeing of community and one’s place of belonging is also intrinsic to this 
value.  
 
Collective accountability strengthens kotahitanga (collective unity) which underpins Māori 
collaborative responses to adverse conditions. Unity is equally a hallmark characteristic of 
Māori whānau (families), which serve as the foundation of Māori identity and thus, the source 
of bonding social capital (Putnam, 2000) within Māori communities. Whakapapa (genealogy) 
also encompasses collective familial responsibilities, including the delegation of emergency 
management roles and in combination with the value whakawhanaungatanga (relational 
linkages) collective authority, agency and reciprocal support arrangements. Manaakitanga 
(collective actions) constitutes the realisation of Māori collective authority and agency through 
collaborative enactment of disaster management practices. The value-driven Māori 
communitarian approach to disaster governance and management instituted in Christchurch 
was effective and accords with best disaster management practices outlined in the Hyogo 
Framework for Action (UNISDR, 2005) and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(UNISDR, 2015). However, this collectivist response was oppositional to the more commonly 
applied ‘command and control’ approach to disaster management, that was adopted by CDEM 
and CERA responders following the earthquakes. 
 
3
 The common values and beliefs of Māori community are endured around land, water, and air as the 
basic constituents of life that are to be valued and continued. It embraces around three fundamental 
concepts known as Whakapapa: genealogical descent, lineage; Mauri: the life force, the crucial principle of being, 
an energy that pervades through all living things; and Ritenga: custom, rules, regulations, protocols, comprises 
rāhui and tapu (ritual prohibition/restriction of the access to an area - either on water or land or resources) (Taiuru, 
2015). 
. 
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Emergency Management Governance, Infrastructure and Engagement with Māori   
 
The lack of relational engagement by Canterbury Civil Defence resulted in the Māori disaster 
response network being inadequately integrated with the formal emergency governance 
infrastructure during the initial response to the earthquakes (Phibbs et al., 2015). As the Te 
Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu tribal Chairman stated:  
 
“It was a bit slow in us getting involved with the authorities, in fact, it took us eight 
days to break in… and establishing contact was… difficult.” (SMS)  
 
Māori engagement with the emergency management infrastructure was eventually negotiated 
through drawing on a pre-existing collaborative relationship with a corporate stakeholder 
involved in post-earthquake lifelines logistics (Phibbs, Kenney & Solomon, 2015). The 
representation of Maori in the formal/national emergency management structure, as an 
accountability holder, also created diagonal accountability relations between the CDEM, 
CERA and Maori. Maori acted as the watchdog organisation within the formal disaster 
recovery system. However, the delay in integrating Māori resources contributed to unnecessary 
duplication as well as gaps in the distribution of material support to Christchurch residents 
(Kenney, 2016). Māori rationalised the weak horizontal and social accountability standards, 
such as poor level of communication and engagement between Civil Defence and the Māori 
community-led response network, as the product of emergency managers’ perceptions of Māori 
as socially invisible within the region. A Canterbury-based Ngāi Tahu (local Māori tribe) leader 
commented as follows:    
 
“We’re not visible in civil defence. That’s why it’s like this [difficult], because we’re 
not visible in there as Ngāi Tahu” (RT).  
  
The research participant’s talk suggests that in addition to the absence of recognition for 
cultural identities, cultural attributes including local indigenous knowledge and practices on 
natural disasters were also not acknowledged. Local knowledge is a key element in developing 
successful and contextually relevant disaster risk reduction governance strategies (Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015). The lack of collaborative governance 
characteristics such as recognition by the government for Māori knowledge pertaining to the 
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Canterbury region was thus a major concern. As another Ngāi Tahu (local Māori tribe) 
responder remarked: 
 
“We know our communities; we know our marae..., our resources, our whenua” (AC) 
 
The importance of integrating Māori community knowledge, and cultural attributes into 
disaster governance strategies as a means to address community needs, is also highlighted. In 
the Christchurch context, the Māori Recovery Network’s initial difficulties engaging with the 
formal emergency infrastructure and integrating response initiatives were eventually resolved 
(Kenney, 2016). However, members of the broader Māori community also experienced 
ongoing accountability and disaster governance challenges when attempting to access 
resources supplied by central government and/or local authorities. Displaced Māori members 
reported about poor social accountability standards within national disaster recovery networks; 
e.g. feeling marginalised by Recovery Assistance Centre responders, and systematic cultural 
insensitivity. As illustrated in the following research participant’s talk: 
 
“… when they opened up the… welfare centres so that people could go and stay there…. 
They were not Māori friendly and… what it meant during the February one 
[earthquake], was that a lot of Māori … wouldn’t go to the centres… So that is why it 
was so important that we got the marae open for them” (KR) 
 
Another critical social accountability standard was the lack of trust in the effectiveness of 
welfare centres and response personnel is inferred in the preceding talk. It is equally suggested 
that the central government’s ability to be culturally responsive to whānau (families), following 
the earthquakes, was inadequate. Within the post-earthquake context, the accountability 
standards such as lack of trust and perceptions of inadequate responsiveness to the needs of the 
community were compounded by critical lapses in collaborative accountability standards, e.g. 
miscommunication and a lack of engagement between Māori and government agents. Although 
the central government established outreach hubs for key ministries at welfare centres, many 
Māori, who despite having no power, water or in some instance homes, struggled to access 
support, particularly financial assistance (Kenney and Phibbs, 2014). As one elderly Māori 
stated: 
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 “I didn’t have any problem filling out the forms; the problem was the person on the 
other side of the counter couldn’t activate them properly. There was always an issue 
…. The wrong form... the wrong answers…  I’d come out feeling really stressed out 
about it, …. Yeah really as if it was a type of abuse, you know …. Anyway, it took several 
goes to sort it out…” (RN) 
 
As a collaborative accountability standard, the establishing contextually relevant and culturally 
responsive welfare centres on Māori was advocated as a means of addressing shortfalls in 
support, as well as ensuring that Māori residents’ needs were fully met. As activation of all 
Ngāi Tahu marae (Māori community centres) occurred within a week of the February 22nd 
earthquake, community access to essential resources and support was assured through the 
Māori Recovery Network. Led by the accountability holder Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu (regional 
tribal authority), the nationally collaborative Māori Earthquake Recovery Network acted 
efficiently and provided support in the form of shelter, food water, clothing medical and social 
services to approximately 20,000 households.  
 
The characteristics of collaborative governance and holistic accountability standards evidenced 
in Māori approaches to disaster management in Christchurch has strengthened intra and 
intertribal ties throughout NZ and fostered working relationships between Māori, government 
and local authorities. The effectiveness of the Māori response to the Canterbury earthquakes 
has also drawn attention to the need for NZ’s Defence and Emergency Management 
infrastructure to institute a fully integrated response to major natural hazard events in the future. 
Next section presents the overall findings and conclusion of the two case study analysis.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion    
 
This paper has aimed to advance our understanding of the shaping of “accountability in 
collaborative governance” in disaster management context. Prior research has empirically 
examined the disaster accounting and accountability in diverse contexts and questioned the 
form of reporting pratcices adopted by disaster management agencies (Everett and Friesen, 
2010; Baker, 2014; Sargiacomo et al., 2014; Lai, 2014; Taylor et al., 2014; Sargiacomo, 2015; 
Sciulli, 2017). Few other researchers attempted to distinguish between “calculative” and 
“narrative” forms of accountabilities (McKernan and McPhail, 2012; Kamuf, 2007; 
Sargiacomo, 2014) and scrutinized the moral and emotional boundaries of disaster 
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accountability (Everett and Friesen, 2010; Baker, 2014; Sagiacomo, 2014; Perkiss and 
Moerman, 2017). The study was also interested on the work of O’Dwyer and Unerman (2008) 
and their idea of creating a platform for holistic accountability practices in NGOs. This study 
has sought to develop and extend this strand of research by examining the collective (Sørensen, 
2012) or holistic (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008) nature of accountability practices that exist in 
the “collaborative governance arena” of disaster recovery. During the aftermath of the 
disasters; the government agencies, community networks and other agencies as accountability 
holders of “collaborative governance arena” engage with collaborative working and 
discursively form and exercise multiple forms of accountabilities, e.g. vertical, horizontal, 
social and diagonal, by shifting and adapting their attention and focus on the urgent disaster 
recovery aims and activities.        
The study compared and contrasted two cases identified from the Christchurch earthquakes in 
New Zealand, firstly the top down state responses led by CDEM and CERA, and secondly the 
Maori earthquake Recovery Network responses adhering to their values and practices. The 
empirical findings of the case one illustrated some critical lapses in relation to the vertical, 
horizontal and social accountability standards during the Christchurch earthquake recovery, 
including a lack of transparency, communication and collaboration in work relations between 
disaster relief organizations. Māori communities lived in Eastern Christchurch were 
particularly disadvantaged in this regard. These findings manifest the importance of 
institutionalizing “mixed accountability standards” in collaborative disaster governance arena 
involving key accountability holders. The ongoing politics among CERA, Christchurch City 
Council and others regarding the ownership and mechanisms of service delivery, detracted 
from effective collaborative governance. At the time of Canterbury earthquakes, the lack of 
genuine efforts by key accountability holders such as CERA and CDEM to establish 
collaborative working relationships with Māori community, equally disrupted the 
implementation of mixed accountability standards in collaborative disaster governance arena.  
 
On the other hand, the responses learned from the Māori earthquake Recovery Network and 
their integration and interaction with state recovery process in later stages of recovery suggest 
that these community networks as social and diagonal accountability holders can enhance the 
mixed accountability standards pursuing a “collaborative working” and “collaborative 
governance” system. In fact, they can articulate the social and diagonal forms of accountability 
standards particularly into collaborative work relationships and widely to collaborative 
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governance arena. As suggested by case evidence, they performed the role of a watchdog 
organization in the governance arena and represented the voices of wider Maori community. 
They also shared their historically and culturally established knowledge on indigenous disaster 
mitigation practices with other key accountability holders in collaborative disaster governance 
arena.  
 
However, based on the questions raised by Messner (2009) and Roberts (2009), the 
accountability and transparency always have limits in their practice because of the existence of 
moral and ethical boundaries, as well as the limits of the accountable self faces when giving an 
account. Using Butler’s (2005) work, they argued that the ideals of a complete transparency or 
accountability could be considered as an impossible fantasy even though it is widely shared 
among the policies and practice, in this case the disaster recovery. Therefore, the performance 
of accountability holders and maintenance of any mixed accountability standards in 
“collaborative disaster governance arena” - either from the government (formal process), Maori 
(socio-cultural process) or integrated/joint perspective, would depend largely on the 
subjections and individual recognitions of the accountable self.  
 
The paper contributes to prior research on disaster accounting and accountability (Everett and 
Friesen, 2010; Hodges, 2012; Taylor et al., 2014; Bakers, 2014; Sargiacomo et al., 2014; 
Walker, 2014; Sargiacomo, 2015; Perkiss and Moerman, 2017; Sciulli, 2017) and O’Dwyer 
and Unerman’s (2008) holistic accountability debate in several interrelated ways. First, it 
showcases how combinations of upward, downward, horizontal and diagonal accountability 
standards (both in calculative and narrative forms) can be effectively integrated into one 
“collaborative disaster governance arena” through the mixing of two contending responses to 
disasters: the formal (state) and socio-cultural (Maori) responses. The “collaborative disaster 
governance” arena concurrently creates the space for both (i) socio-cultural and diagonal 
accountability standards based on Maori values and practices, and (ii) more formal bureaucratic 
and scientific accountability measures regulated by the State. Second, the study findings have 
also highlighted the need for meta-governing parameters, including institutional design of 
governance arenas, political, budgetary, legal and discursive framing, as well as facilitation of 
inter-organizational and community participation in collaborative governance. These practices 
will facilitate the institutionalization of a form of collective accountability standards in the 
collaborative governance arenas.    
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The paper’s findings reflect the importance of having several accountability policies at the 
national disaster management level. First, the analysis of Māori experiences and responses 
suggests that establishing national accountability processes for pre-disaster preparedness and 
short-term recovery is paramount. It seems vital to establish an efficient collaborative 
managerial culture in disaster mitigation and build trust across the various sectors. Second, the 
experiences gained from responding to the Canterbury earthquakes highlight the necessity of 
establishing “contingency plans” for accountability under special conditions. During the 
aftermath of a major disaster, for example a collaborative co-governance approach to recovery 
could ensure the proper transparency of governance during the stages of rehabilitation and 
reconstruction until full recovery has been achieved.  The study’s analysis of emergency 
management governance, infrastructure and engagement with Māori network suggests that 
effective partnership and collaboration around the principles of transparency, governance, and 
that communication of accountability information between key disaster management agencies 
and community level stakeholders, need to be embedded at every level of response including 
government policy.      
The paper presents critical reflections based on the study of two cases during the aftermath of 
Canterbury disasters occurred in 2010 and 2011.  However, it has to be acknowledged that New 
Zealand is recognised as a country which sets an example for other Sendai Framework 
signatory countries on strengthening their own collaborative governance and accountability 
activities, as well as measures based on the lessons learnt and experiences of previous events. 
It should highlight that the New Zealand Civil Defence has strengthened existing 
conversations, and also initiated new dialogues with various sectors of society with a view to 
developing a new national resilience strategy since the Christchurch earthquakes (MCDEM, 
n.d.b). Having experienced several recent events such as Seddon and Kaikoura earthquake 
sequences and Port Hills fires, it is evident that the government has introduced policy level 
improvements based on the lessons learnt from the Christchurch Earthquake. One such 
example is the recent government Bill for the Hurunui/Kaikoura Earthquakes Recovery (2016). 
Relating to the contents of this Bill, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) 
produced a regulatory impact statement to help inform the main policy decisions taken by the 
Government (The Treasury New Zealand, 2016). It establishes the essential requirements of 
engaging with substantially affected persons and requiring the Minister to take into 
consideration their comments, delivers a greater degree of transparency and accountability, and 
provides for participatory rights to check on the Executive. Also recently in late July 2017, 
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DPMC released a commissioned report: Whole of Government Report: Lessons from the 
Canterbury earthquake sequence prepared by the Greater Christchurch Group (2017). This 
report is based on more than 200 published articles related to the recovery from the Canterbury 
earthquake sequence. The report has identified nearly 50 lessons across various topic areas and 
offered government’s perspective on the lessons drawn from the recovery efforts. Among the 
identified lessons, four lessons concern with public participation and community engagement 
having considered the evidence-based limitations and criticisms.  
Finally, from the lessons learned in emergency management and earthquake recovery from the 
2010 -2011 Canterbury Earthquakes illustrate that there is still more opportunities for further 
research about natural disasters, including COVID-19 pandemic disease in 2020, and 
academics should devote more efforts on this topic, as for the true "impact" that focused 
research might have on organizations and societies. The COVID-19 is more severely felt than 
those of some other natural disasters in the past (Sargiacomo, 2014, 2015), mainly because of 
its deeply risen numbers of deaths and infections as well as significant institutional challenges 
and socio-economic damages caused in many countries. It’s really important and timely, 
therefore, to examine the COVID-19 disaster recovery responses and policies by different 
countries, and explore the challenges and failures, and sometimes, unintended consequences of 
“accountability in collaborative governance” mechanisms among different levels of 
government organizations, businesses, NGOs and community level organizations within each 
country.  
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